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Introducti'on
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
(hereinafter designated as "the Act"I accomplished
four major objectives.1 First, it codified the
"restrictive" theory of sovereign immunity originally
adopted by the State Department in the famous Tate
Letter of 1952,2 by declaring that "[ulnder interna-
tional law, states are not immune from the jurisdic-
tion of foreign courts insofar as their commercial
activities are concerned."3 Second, the Act provided
that claims of foreign states to immuni y would in the
future be decided solely by the courts.4 This change
was intended to ensure uniform application of the princi-
ples embodied in the Act, 5 and was a reform long advo-
cated by commentators.0 A third objective of the Act
* JD. Candidate, Yale Law School Class of 1980. The
author wishes to thank Professor W.,Michael Reisman for his help
and comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. Pub. L. No. 94-583, §4(a), 90 Stat. 2892-2897 (codified
at 28 U.S.C, §§1602-1611 (1976)),
2. Letter from Acting Legal Adviser to the Department of
State Jack B. Tate to Acting Attorney General Phillip B. Perlman,
reprinted in 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
3. 28 U.S.C. §1602 (1976).
4. id.
5. H.R. REP. NO. 1487, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 7, reprinted in
[19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604 [hereinafter cited as H.R.
REP. NO. 94-1487],
6. See Jessup, fas the Supreme Court Abdicated One of Its
Functions?, 40 AM. J, INT'L L. 168 C1946); Dickinson, The Law of
Nations as National Law: "Political Questions". 104 U. PA. L. REV.
451, 477-479 C1956); and Note, International Law--Sovereign
Immunity--The Last Straw in Judicial Abdication, 46 TUL. L. REV.
841 (1972).
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was to set up a procedure for service of process ena-
bling plaintiffs to gain in personam jurisdiction over
foreign states, thus making unnecessary the objection-
able practice of attaching the property of a foreign
state in order to gain jurisdiction.7
Finally, the Act improved the position of plain-
tiffs by making the property of foreign states liable
to execution under certain conditions.0 Although much
has been written on the changes wrought by the Act,
few commentators have done more than mention the exe-
cution provisions and none have examined them in de-
tail.9 The purpose of this article will be to examine
the changes made by the Act in the area of sovereign
immunity from execution and attachment, with par-
ticular emphasis on the implications for plaintiffs en-
gaged in international business transactions.
A. Prior Practice
Prior to the passage of the Act both the State
Department and the courts had recognized a distinction
between sovereign immunity from jurisdiction and sover-
eign immunity from execution and attachment. 1 0 Under
the restrictive theory of immunity purportedly follow-
ed by the United States after 1952, states were not
immune from the jurisdiction of American courts in
7. This is accomplished by 28 U.S.C. §1608 (1976). See
H.R. EP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 5, at 23-26. For comments on
this development, see von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976, 17 COLH. J. TRANS. L. 33; 46-48 (1977) [herein-
after cited as von Mehren],
8. See 28 U.S.C. §§1609-1611 (1976),
9. Among the commentators who have treated .the execution
provisions are von Mehren, supra note 7, at 61-65; and Weber,
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Its Origin, Mean-
ing, and Effect, 3 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 1, 20-24 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Weber].
10. New York & Cuba M.S,S. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp,
684 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). For an expression of the State Department's
view, see 45 BEP'T STATE BULL. 275, 278 (1961). The distinction
is also discussed in Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 21 Misc.
2d 1086, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sup. Ct. 1959); and Stephen v. Zivnos-
tenska Banka, N.C., 15 A.D.2d 111, 222 N.Y.S.2d 128, aff'd, 12 N.Y.
2d 781, 235 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962).
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cases arising from their commercial activities,1 1 How-
ever, their exemption from execution and attachment was
broader, extending even to commercial activities.
American practice recognized an absolute immunity, from
either type of seizure even in those cases where courts,
for one reason or another, found no jurisdictional
immunity to exist.1 2 Commentators frequently criticized
the failure to allow-attachment or execution as render-
ing the exercise of jurisdiction a merely nominal ges-
ture, since plaintiffs could rarely get satisfaction
of a judgment without one or the other type of property
seizure.
The State Department, whose "suggestions" in
sovereign immunity cases were usually considered
11, The most important such case prior to the Act was Victory
Transport, Inc, v, Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y
Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 2d Cir. 1964), cert, denied, 381 U.S.
934 (1965), which contains a thorough discussion of courtst appli-
cations of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.
12. See, e.g., Weilamann v. Chase 1anhattan Bank, 21'Misc.
2d 1086, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Dexter & Carpenter, Inc,
v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (2d Cir, 1930), cert.
denied, 282 U.S. 896 (1931); and Bradford v. Chase National Bank,
24 F.Supp. 28 CS.D.N.Y. 1938), aff'd. sub nom., Berger v. Chase
National Bank, 105 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir, 1939), aff'd sub nom,, Schram
v. Chase National Bank, 309 U.S. 632 (1940). But at least one
American court has permitted execution against the property of a
foreign state. Harris & Co. Advertising, Inc, v. Republic of Cuba,
127 So.2d 687 (Fla. Dist, Ct. App. 1961).
13. See Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Imm
nities of Foreign States, 28 BR. Y.B. INT'L L. 220, 241-244 (1951);
Garcia-Mora, The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity of Foreign States
and Its Recent Modifications, 42 VA. L. REV, 335, 359 (1956); Com-
ment, International Law--Sovereign Immunity--Seizure of Property
under the Restrictive Immunity Doctrine, 54 MICA. L. REV. 1008,
1010 (1956); Timberg, Sovereign Immunity, State Trading, Socialism
and Self-Deception, 56 NW. U. L. 1 RV. 109, 119-122 (1961); Brandon,
The Case Against the Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity, 21
INS. COUNS-. J. 11, 14 C1954); Note, Sovereign Immunity vs. Execution
of Judgment: A Need to Reappraise Our National Policy, 13 BOST. COL.
IND. & COM. L. REV. 369, 378-382 (1971); Note, Sovereign Immunity-
Waiver and Execution: Arguments From Continental Jurisprudence,
74 YALE LJ, 887, 912 C1965).
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binding by the courts,14 also adhered to the theory of
absolute immunity from seizure,1 5 at times urging it on
courts which were less than enthusiastic in their
reception of the principle.16 In 1959, the State De-
partment partially changed its position, adopting a
policy under which pre-judgment attachment of state
property was Dermitted,-but only for purposes of gain-
ing jurisdiction in quasi in rem actions.17 However.
absolute immunity from execution remained the rule,
even when there was no immunity from attachment for
jurisdictional purposes,1 8
As noted above, the Act prohibits the use of at-
tachment as a means of gaining jurisdiction and
severely restricts its use for other purposes.19 In
addition, the Act reverses both the State Department
position and the prevailing case law by making the
property of a foreign state liable to execution under
certain circumstances. 2 0 However, it does continue
the previous distinction between immunity from seizure
and immunity from jurisdiction by providing states with
broader immunity from execution and attachment than
from jurisdiction. One of the most important questions
raised by the Act is the exact extent to which the
property of a foreign state is now subject to execution
and attachment.
14. See generally Lyons, The Conclusiveness of the "Sug-
gestion" and Certificate of the American State Department, 24
BR. Y.B. INT!L L. 116 (1947); and Chemical Natural Resources, Inc.
v. Republic of Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d 864 (S.Ct. Pa.
1966).
15. See, e.g., Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 21
Misc. 2d 1086, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sup. Ct. 1959); and Dexter &
Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.
1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 896 (1931).
16. See Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India.
446 F.2d 1198, 1201 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985.
17. See the letters reprinted in 57 AN, J, INT'L L. 408
(1963) and 1. Whiteman, 6 DIG. INT'L L. 709, 711-12 (1968).
18. Three Stars Trading Co. v. Republic of Cuba, 32 Misc.
2d 4, 222 N.Y.S.2d 675 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
19. See pp. 138-139 infra.
20. 28 U.S.C. §§1609-1611 (1976).
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B. §1609; Retention Pf Absolute I'mmuni'ty, as the Rule
Section 1609 of the Act provides that, subject to
international agreements to which the. United States is
a party,2 1 property of a foreign state in the United
States "shall be immune from attachment, arrest, and
execution except as provided in sections 1610 and 1611
of this chapter." The drafters of the Act were careful
to retain immunity from execution as the rule, rather
than enumerating categories of property which were sub-
ject to immunity and denying immunity to those types
of property not covered,2 2 Thus, when execution is
sought against state property, the ultimate burden lies
on the foreign state to prove its entitlement to
immunity, 2 3
C. §1611: Property Granted Absolute Immunity
From Execution
Section 1611Cb) provides absolute immunity from
execution for certain property of a foreign state and
its agencies, instrumentalities, and subdivisions, But
it creates difficulties by departing from the Act's
chosen principle that sovereign immunity is premised
upon the nature of the underlying act or transaction,
rather than its purpose. This section of the Act re-
verts to the purpose test by looking to the use of the
property as controlling its entitlement to immunity.
The problems raised by this departure from the stand,
ards applied elsewhere in the Act are compounded by,
the failure to provide adequate .guidelines to ensure
consistent application of the Act.
The courts, to whom is left the task of determin-
ing the purpose or use of the property, will have to
formulate their own criteria, since neither the Act nor
its legislative history makes clear the method by which
21. The Act is also subject to future treaties or interna-
tional agreements, since they are of equal rank with legislation.
Congress worded 28 U.S.C. §1609 (1976) in this manner so as not to
leave the impression that it was approving future international
agreements on this subject. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 5,
at 10,
22. Imunities of Foreign States: Hearings on S. 3493 Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Claims and Government Relations of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 31-32 (1973) [here-
inafter cited as Hearings on S. 3493],
23. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 5, at 17,
113
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the determination of purpose is to be made. The Act
is an improvement on the Tate Letter, which was often
criticized for failing to provide guidelines which
would enable courts to apply consistently its restric-
tive doctrine of sovereign immunity,24 but it is not,
and could not be, explicit on all points. Some vague-
ness is to be expected in all legislation of this
type. Judicial decision-makers will have to rely on
the overall intent of the Act and their previous ex-
perience in this area to provide themselves with a
workable method of interpreting the provisions of the
Act.
The question at the threshold in any instance
where the absolute immunity granted in §1611(b) is
raised as a defense is, of course, whether the proper-
ty is used for a purpose which renders it immune from
execution. When such a defense is pleaded, a ques-
tion will arise: Are the assertions of officials of
the foreign state as to the use of the property con-
clusive, or may inquiries be undertaken to determine
the facts of the case? This problem can be broken
down into two parts: are the officials' statements
dispositive, and, if not, by whose standards are the
facts to be judged? The answers to these questions
are not particularly difficult. Under the Act, it is
clear that courts must look beyond the statements of
those representing the foreign state, to the facts of
the case. 2 5 Furthermore, the evidentiary standards to
be applied are those of the American forum.
20
24. See, e.g., Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States--
A Proposal For Reform of United States Law, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV, 901,
906-908 (1969).
25. The House Report assumes that statements and other evi-
dence produced by the defendant state will be only prima facie
evidence of immunity, and will be subject to rebuttal by the
plaintiff. H.R. KEP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 5, at 17.
26. Id. at 12. "This bill ... sets forth the sole and
exclusive standards to be used in resolving questions of sovereign
immunity raised by foreign states before Federal and State courts
in the United States. It is intended to preempt any other State
or Federal law (excluding applicable international agreements)
for according immunity to foreign sovereigns, their political sub-
divisions, their agencies, and their instrumentalities." Cf.
Bishop, New United States Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity, 47
AM. J. INT'L LAW" 93, 102-106 (1953) (absent international stand-
ards, only those of the forum can and should be logically applied).
[VOL 15
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Implementation of the restrictive theory of immu-
nity from execution requires judicial assertiveness.
It is up to each court to determine, as far as possi-
ble, the use to which the property is or will be put
by inquiring into the facts of the case before it and
weighing all available evidence. The statements of
agents of the foreign state, while entitled to great
weight, are merely one type of evidence which may be
available; they have not generally been held conclu-
sive as to use or any other issue whether or not there
has been contradictory evidence. 2 7 The argument that
such an inquiry, made in the face of a direct assertion
by the foreign state, would be an affront to the
state's dignity and harm American foreign relations is
irrelevant in a legal proceeding arising under the
Act. Congress left no doubt that the immunity decision
was to be guided by legal principles, not practical
foreign policy considerations.2  For a court to accept
as conclusive the undocumented assertions of obviously
27. In Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v.
The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938), the Spanish ambassador inter-
vened in an action, claiming sover-eign immunity for a libeled ship.
The Supreme Court held that:
...[The District Court] was not bound, as the Court of
Appeals thought, to accept the allegations of the sug-
gestion as conclusive. The Department of State having
declined to act, the want of admiralty jurisdiction
because of the alleged public status of the vessel and
the right of the Spanish Government to demand posses-
sion of the vessel as owner if it so elected, were
appropriate subjects for judicial inquiry upon proof
of the matters alleged.
But the filed suggestion, though sufficient as a
statement of the contentions made, was not proof of its
allegations. This Court has explicitly declined to give
such a suggestion the force of proof or the status of a
like suggestion coming from the executive department of
our government....
The district court rightly declined to treat the
suggestion as conclusive or sufficient as proof to
require the court to relinquish its jurisdiction....
Id. at 75-76,
See also National American Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,
420 F.Supp. 954, 956-957 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Pan American Tankers
Corp. v. Republic of Vietnam, 291 F.Supp. 49, 52-53 (S.D.N.Y. 19681;
and Ervin-v. Quintinilla, 99 F,2d 935, 939 (5th Cir. 1938), cert.
denied, 306 U,S. 635' 1939)
28. HR. REP. NO, 94-1487, supra note 5, at 7.
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interested representatives of foreign states would be
to create a barrier to execution analogous to the
barrier to jurisdiction long presented by a State De-
partment suggestion of immunity.2 9 It would allow in
by the back door the very policy considerations which
Congress hoped that the Act would remove from the
decisionmaking process.30
Moreover, when considering the representatives'
statements and other available evidence, the standards
to be applied by the courts are those of the forum, not
the foreign state.3 1 Whether the evidence is suffici-
ent to show that property has a certain use, and whe-
ther the use shown is one which entitles the property
to immunity, are questions of American law. Since
sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense under the
Act, the defendant state must provide prima facie evi-
dence that the use of the property entitles it to
immunity; only then is the burden of proof shifted to
the plaintiff to show a non-immune use. 3 2 While the
standards may currently appear somewhat vague, they
will undoubtedly be further defined as more cases in-
volving the execution provisions of the Act make their
way into the legal process.
Section 1611(b)(l)--in which the funds of a
foreign central bank or monetary authority, on deposit
with an American bank and "held for its own account,"
are granted immunity in all cases except those in which
the central bank or its parent government has explicit-
ly waived immunity from execution--raises few problems.
The purpose of this provision is twofold: to encourage
deposits of foreign funds in the United States by en-
suring that such funds will not be disturbed by Ameri-
can courts, and to prevent the harm to American foreign
relations which might occur if foreign states' monetary
reserves were subject to execution.39 The-Act itself
does not make clear when a foreign central bank's funds
are "held for its own account.U The House Report ex-
plains that this subsection applies to funds which are
29, See Lyons, supra note 14, at 144-146,
30. H.R. REP-. NO. 94-1487, supra note 5, at 7.
31. See note 26 Suprq.
32. H.R. RP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 5, at 17,
33, Id. at 31,
[VOL, 5116
19793 EXECUTI:ON AND ATTACHMNT NDER TEE FSIA
"used or held in connection with central banking acti-
vities, as distinguished from funds used solely to
finance the commercial transactions of other entities
or of foreign states." 34
Making such distinctions is likely to prove diffi-
cult in practice, particularly where funds in an ac-
count have been, and continue to be, used for both cen-
tral banking and non-central banking functions. Al-
though courts might give broad effect to this subsec-
tion by refusing to allow execution against funds in
accounts which serve in such a dual capacity, this re-
sult would be inconsistent with the purpose of the Act.
Its effect would be to preclude execution against the
funds of foreign central banks in almost all cases,
since it would quickly become apparent to central banks
that it would be to their advantage to begin mixing the
uses of the funds in each account if they did not do so
already. A more equitable result, and one more consis-
tent with the Act, could be achieved by examining the
account records and extracting an approximation of the
relative amounts used in central banking and non-cen-
tral banking functions. 3 5 The court might then allow
execution against a percentage of the account corres-
ponding to that used for non-central banking
34. Id.
35. The court in Harris & Co. Advertising, Inc. v. Republic
of Cuba, 127 So.2d 687 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961), seems to have
had such a solution in mind when it put the burden on the state to
show that the bank accounts sought to be executed against were
immune:
In the present case, deposits in various banks
have been attached, which, until it is shown by
preponderance of the evidence that they are directly
related to activities jure inperii, cannot be deemed
immune from the powers of the courts within the
territories of which they are kept by the decision
of the foreign government itself. It would not be
compatible with the principle of judicial powers
of a sovereign nation if funds deposited as private
funds in a private bank in this country, particularly
if derived, used; or intended to be used in business
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functions.3 6 Such a procedure would be greatly simpli-
fied by the availability of the account records, which
probably would have been brought in by the central bank
to support its claim of immunity.
The lack of guidelines for implementing the pur-
pose test makes §1611(b)(2) more difficult to apply
than §1611(b)(l). Much confusion will be engendered
by the former, which grants absolute immunity to state
property which "is, or is intended to be, used in
connection with a military activity and (A) is of a
military character or (B) is under the control of a
military authority or defense agency." The reasons for
the inclusion of §1611(b)(2) are explained in the
legislative history.3 7 Implementation of United States
foreign policy often requires purchases of military
equipment and supplies in the United States by foreign
governments, and allowing execution against such pro-
perty would jeopardize that policy. In addition, Con-
gress feared that a foreign state might permit execu-
tion against American military property within its
territory under a reciprocal application of the Act.
But the burden remains on the foreign state to
show that the property in question is "used in connec-
tion with a military activity." The courts will have
to interpret this term. The legislative history of the
Act sheds some light upon its intended scope. The
drafters of the Act designed this subsection to pro-
vide immunity for "food, clothing, fuel and office
equipment which, although not of a military character,
is essential to military operations."3 8 It was obvious-
ly the intention of the drafters to draw a distinction
between military and "civilian" uses, as those terms
are generally understood. However, these categories
shade into one another at times, as Congress seems to
have recognized in immunizing property "used in con-
nection with a military activity." The term "used in
connection with" is broader than "used for": the former
36. This solution would not be entirely satisfactory, since
a state could switch funds from one account to another, thus
evading the jurisdiction of a court by reducing the assets liable
to execution in the jurisdiction to virtually nothing. While pre-
judgment attachment would aid plaintiffs, its availability is
limited. See pp. 138-139 in text.
37. H.R REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 5, at 31.
38. id.
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also covers property whose use is only peripherally
military. Should the courts look beyond the Act for
guidance, they will find that the "civil-military" dis-
tinction has been drawn elsewhere in the law. The Su-
preme Court, in construing analogous statutory provi-
sions, has limited their scope to uses which would com-
monly be considered "military," while at the same time
recognizing that the exigencies of war may expand
their scope somewhat by providing a different balanc-
ing of the relevant factors.3 9 Such an interpretation
39. For instance, §321 of the Transportation Act of 1940,
49 U.S.C. §65, provides that railroads were to be paid at land
grant rates Ci.e., fifty percent of the prevailing commercial
tariff rates) for transporting "military or naval property of the
United States moving for military or naval and not for civil-use."
A number of cases ensued as the railroads and the government
sought to clarify the types of property covered. The leading
cases, Powell v. United States, 330 U.S, 238 (1947), and Northern
Pacific Ry. Co. T. United States, 330 U.S. 248 (1947), were de-
cided the same day, and were intended to be read together. In
Powell, farm fertilizer was purchased by the United States and
shipped over the respondents' lines. The shipments were consigned
to the British Ministry of War Transport for use in Britain's war-
time program for intensified production of food. In finding that
the property did not come under the provisions of §321, the Court
emphasized the difference between military and civilian use:
In the second place, the language of §321(a) empha-
sizes a distinction which would be largely obliterated
if the requirements of national defense, accentuated by
a total war being waged in other parts of the world,
were read into it. Section 321(a) uses "military or naval"
use in contrast to "civil" use. Yet if these fertilizer
shipments are not for "civil" use, we would find it
difficult to hold that like shipments by the Government
to farmers for this country during the course of the war
were for "civil" use. For in total war food supplies
of allies are pooled; and the importance of maintaining
full agricultural production in this country if the war
effort was to be successful cannot be gainsaid. When
the resources of a nation are mobilized for war, most of
what it does is for a military end--whether it be ration-
ing, or increased industrial or agricultural production,
price control, or the host of other familiar activities.
But in common parlance, such activities are civil, not
military. It seems to -us that Congressmarked that dis-
tinction when it wrote §321(a), If that is not the dis-
tinction, then "for military or naval and not for civil use"
would have to be read "for military or naval use ot for
civil use which serves the national defense." So to
ll.
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would fit quite well in the context of the Act,
39. (Continued)
construe §321(a) would it seems tQ us, largely or
substantially wipe out the line whicb. Congres. drew
and, in time of war, would blend "civil" and "military"
when Congress undertook to separate them. Yet §321Ca)
was designed as permanent legislation, not as a tem-
porary measure to meet the exigencies of war. It was
to supply the standard by which rates for government
shipments were to be determined at all times--in peace
as well as in war. Only if the distinction between
"military" and "civil" which common parlance marks is
preserved, will the statute have a constant meaning
whether shipments are made in days of peace, at times
when there is hurried activity for defense, or during
state of war. 330 U.S. at 245-46,
At the same time, the Court recognized in Northern Pacific Ry. Co.
that items might be for military use, although not necessarily,
intended for the direct use of the armed forces:
It is also suggested that the property covered by
the exception in §321(a) is confined to property for
ultimate use directly by the armed forces. Under that
view -materials shipped for the construction of vesselE
for the lMaritime Commission and used to service troops
at home or abroad would not be "military or naval"
property. We likewise reject that argument. Civilian
agencies may service the armed forces or act as adjuncts
to them. The Maritime Commission is a good example. An
army and navy on foreign shores or in foreign waters
cannot live and fight without a supply fleet in their
support. The agency, whether civil or military, which
performs that function is serving the armed forces. The
property which it employs in that service is military
or naval property, serving a military or naval function.
But in general the use to which the property is to
be put is the controlling test of its military or naval
character, Pencils as well as rifles may be military
property, Indeed, the nature of modern war, its multi-
farious aspects, the requirements of the men and women
who constitute the armed forces and their adjuncts give
military or naval property such a broad sweep as to in-
clude almost any type of property, More than articles
actually used by nilitary or naval personnel in combat
are included, Military dr naval use includes all
property consumed by the armed forces or by their adjuncts,
all property which they use to further their projects,
all property which serves their many needs or wants in
[70L.-5
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If it is determined that the property is tused in
connection with a military activity," then it is im-
mune from execution if either of the conditions in
§1611(b)(A) or CB) is fulfilled. Paragraph (A) has a
much narrower scope than (B). Section 1611(b)(2)(A)
grants immunity only if both the character and the
function of the property are military. 0 This creates
a dual test which will prove redundant in the great
majority of cases, Property which is military in
character, such as tanks and missiles, will almost al-
ways be used in connection with a military activity,
and would therefore be immune under either test. The
dual requirement, however, becomes important and may
raise issues in cases involving property which is mili-
tary in character, but the end use of which is in dis-
pute. A good example is a shipment of pistols, which
might be used by the armed forces, the police, or some
special organization which is para-military in nature.
The immunity granted in §1611(b)(2)(B) is, however,
much broader. Under this provision, property used in
connection with a military activity need only be "under
the control of a military authority or defense agency"
in order to be immune from execution. Thus, the nature
or character of the property is irrelevant; the key
factors in determining when immunity exists are the use
of the property and the nature of the agency having
control over it.
Courts attempting to interpret this section will
find the tongressional guidelines even more vague than
elsewhere in this legislation. For instance, the defi-
nition given to "control" is intended to include
authority over disposition and use, without necessarily
requiring physical control or title to the property.41
39, (Continued p.2.)
training or preparation for war, in combat, in main-
taining them at home or abroad, in their occupation
after victory is won. It is the relation of the
shipment to the -military or naval effort that is con-
trolling under §321(a). The property in question
may have to be reconditioned, repaired, processed
or treated in some other way before it serves their
needs. But that does not detract from its status
as military or naval property.
330 U.S. 248, 253-55,
40. H.R. REP, NO. 94-1487, supra note 5, at 31,
41. Id.
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No explanation of the important term "military author-
ity" is given, a circumstance which will probably lead
to broad judicial interpretations.42
Under the scant guidance given in this section,
it would seem likely that various problems will arise,
For instance, it would be to the advantage of states
which are ruled by juntas or military governments to
claim that all of their property is used in connection
with a military activity. Certainly, such a government
is a "military authority" under a literal reading of
the Act. What then should be done if it claims im-
munity for a Cadillac which it has bought for the of-
ficial use of the colonel who heads the state oil
company? Given the context, no court could find that
such a use was "in. connection with a military activi-
ty," since the sale of oil is obviously a commercial
activity. But the example illustrates that, given the
breadth of the term "military authority," it seems
likely that the immunity granted in §1611Cb)(2)CB) will
be circumscribed only by interpretation of the require-
ment that the property be "used in connection with a
military activity."
The inclusion of the wording "used, or intended to
be used in connection with a military activity" may it-
self contain a loophole, since this phrase may well be
interpreted to include all property under the control
of a military authority, Astute counsel for foreign
states will quickly learn that, under this wording, the
state need only assert an intent to use the property
in connection with a military activity; the use can al-
ways be changed once the property is out of the United
States. Even property currently operated in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity Ce.g.,
a commercial airliner), might slip through this loop-
hole if a court were to accept a state's claim of an
intent to use it in connection with a future military
activity, since property is immune if its present or
intended future use is military.43 In dealing with
42, It is doubtful whether the immunity would depend, for
instance, upon whether the military authority were recognized by
the United States as the de jure government of the state. Cf.
Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N,Y.
372, 138 N.E. 24 Ct. App. 1923) (de facto government of Russia
held entitled to sovereign immunity despite fact of U.S. non-
recognition).
43. See H.R. MP. D 94-1487, supra note 5, at 31.
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such assertions by foreign states, courts should keep
in mind pat the statements are only evidence to he
weighed. Other evidence, parttcularly prior practice
of the state and any statements made in the course of
business dealings concerning the future use of the pro-
perty, may also be highlN relevant.
D. §1610CaI: Excepti-ons to the Rule of Immuntt from
Execution
The inquiry into the immunity from execution of
the property, of a foreign state does not end with
§1611. Even if property is not absolutely immune under
§1611 by virtue of its use, courts must still look to
§1610 to ascertain whether it falls into one of the
categories of property specifically excepted from im-
munity. If it does not come under one of these cate,
gories, then it is still immune.
In order to be excepted from immunity from exeeu-
tion under §1610(a), the property of a foreign state45
must first of all be "used for a commercial activity in
the United States." No explanation of this phrase is
given, but its key is the term "commercial activity,"
44. Cf, National American Corporation v. Federal Republic
of Nigeria, 420 FSupp. 954 CS.D.N.Y. 1976) CAffidavits of
Nigerian officials to the effect that the signing of contract at
issue was "an act concerning the armed forces" held not sufficient
to require granting a motion for dismissal; resolution of the is-
sue must await trial).
45. A major problem for courts will undoubtedly be deter-
mining the ownership of property under economic systems different
from our own. Plaintiffs will tend to seek declarations of agency
ownership in order to invoke the more liberal provisions of 28
U.S.C. §1610(b) (1976), while defendants will be more likely to
try to prove state ownership. Among the cases where the ownership
problem has been discussed are Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press
Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Edlow International v.
Nuklearna Elektrarna Krsko, 441 F. Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1977); Prelude
Corp. v. Owners of F/V Atlantik, 1971 A.M.C 2651 (N.D. Cal. 1971);
and The I Congresso del Partido, [1977] 1 Lloyd's L. Rep. 536 (Adm.
Ct.).
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which is defined in §1603Cd). 46 In both §1603 and
§1610 the emphasis is on the difference between activi-
ties which are commercial in nature (z. e.. those which
are "customarily carried on for profit" in the American
economic system), and those whose "essential nature is
public or governmental."4 7 The consideration of "pur-
pose" in characterizing an activity is specifically
rejected under the Act. 4 8 An activity which is by
nature commercial, but which is entered into by a state
for a public or governmental purpose, remains a " com-
mercial activity."49 Property which is used for a com-
mercial activity is thus liable to execution even if
46. "A 'commercial activityt means either a regular course
of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or
act. The commercial character of an activity shall be determined
by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular
transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose." 28
U.S.C.91603(d) (1976).
47. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 5, at 16.
48. Id. "Thus, a contract by a foreign government to buy
provisions or equipment for its armed forces or to construct a
governmental building constitutes a commercial activity....
Such contracts should be considered to be commercial contracts,
even if their ultimate object is to further a public purpose."
The Act's reliance on the nature of the activity leads to the
results characterized as "astonishing" in Victory Transport, Inc.
v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d
354, 359 C2d Cir, 1964), by removing jurisdictional immunity
from such acts as a foreign state's "leasing of property, its
borrowing of money, [and] its employment or engagement of laborers,
clerical staff or public relations or marketing agents." H.R.
REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 5, at 16.
It is important to note that the Act renders obsolete in
this regard the categories of immune activities set out in Victo
Transport, and continued reliance on that case is misplaced. For
an example of a court relying on the Victory Transport categories
to reach a decision which is wrong under the Act's standards, see
Gittler v. German Information Center, 95 l4isc.2d 788, 408 N.Y.S,
2d 600 CSup. Ct. 1978).
49. "As the definition indicates, the fact that the goods
or services to be procured through a contract are to be used for
a public purpose is irrelevant; it is the essentially commercial
nature of an activity or transaction that is critical." H.R. REP.
No. 94-1487, supra note 5, at 16. See United Euram Corp, v.
U.S.S.R., 461 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) in which the court held
that contracts signed by an American impresario and a Soviet
agency were commercial in character, despite having been entered
into pursuant to a U.S.-U.S.S.R. cultural exchange agreement.
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the activity is one carried on for a public purpose.5 0
The vagueness of the term "used for a commercial
activity" seems bound to lead to unnecessary confusion
and conflicting interpretations, as courts grapple with
the question whether "used for" requires actual use of
the property in the United States. It seems unlikely
that Congress intended to restrict the category of
property "used for a commercial activity" to cases of
actual operation.51 Such an interpretation would, for
instance, render immune from execution a cargo of Pepsi
Cola which might be in a Baltimore warehouse awaiting
shipment to the Soviet Union, a result which is hardly
consistent with the tenor of the Act, and which cannot
be explained by reference to any of its principles.
Mere ownership by a state of property which ordinarily
is, and may later be, used for a commercial purpose, or
of property which is commercial in nature, should
satisfy this requirement. Thus, property which is held
but not actually in operation in the United States
should be liable to execution. This view is supported
by evidence in the legislative history of an earlier
version of the Act that property need not be in opera-
tion in order to be subject to execution.5 2 Such a
50. While the demise of Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria
General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir.
1964), as a precedent in the area of jurisdictional immunity is
clear (see note 48 aupral, at least one commentator has suggested
that its criteria may still have some validity in the area of im-
munity from execution. See von Mehren, supra note 7, at 61. How-
ever, this is not correct. Victory Transport was an important, if
ultimately unsuccessful, attempt to provide guidelines for deter-
mination of immunity from jurisdiction by fashioning categories
based on both the nature and the purpose of a state's acts. Trans-
fer of its criteria or categories to cases arising under the
Sovereign Immunities Act can only produce confusion and inconsis-
tent results, since the Act uses different criteria to determine
immunity from execution.
51. If this were so, then consistency would require that
property "used in connection with a military activity," and there-
fore immune under 28 U.S.C. §1611(h)(2) (1976), also he operated or
used in the United States. Such a result -makes no sense and can not
be what was intended. Se !.R. UEP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 5, at 31.
52. See Hearings on S. 3493, supra note 22, at 45. "The
governing principle, broadly stated, is that property held for
commercial purposes should be available for the satisfaction of
judgments rendered in connection with commercial activities,"
Cemphasis addedl_ Although not controlling as to the present
meaning, the passage is at least indicative of the intent of the
drafters,
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broad construction would be in harmony with the
general purposes of the Act since it would restrict
the immunity of foreign states engaged in commercial
activity. Of course, if this construction is rejected
and actual use of the property in the United States is
held to be a prerequisite to execution, the scope of
§1610(a) will be reduced and execution against state
property will be less frequent.
But no matter which construction is adopted, an
additional problem will present itself. Property
which is "used for a commercial activity" may also
have contemporaneous uses which would tend to render
it immune from execution. Examples of such "mixed
use" might include a shipment of cement, part of which
is intended for use in constructing a military airbase
and part of which is for civilian distribution; or a
building whose use is divided between a consulate and
the foreign state's official agency charged with pur-
chasing American coal.53 The issue is not unique to
this section; the problem of "mixed use" arises in
various provisions of the Act, and one can only hope
for a uniform treatment of the problem. Consistent
application of the principles embodied in the Act
would require allowing execution in proportion to that
portion of the property dedicated to commercial use,
but obviously this will be impossible in many cases.54
Once the threshold question of whether the proper-
ty is used for a commercial activity has been answer-
ed affirmatively, it is then liable to execution if it
fulfills any one of the requirements of §1610(a) or
(b). It is important to note that the approach used
to withdraw immunity differs between subsections. Sub-
section 1610(a), which applies to the property of
foreign states and their agencies, instrumentalities
53. The problem of "mixed use" of bank accounts is dis-
cussed at pp. 115-116 szp.
54. For instance, an automobile which was used by members of
both a Soviet Trade Mission and its embassy would be "used for
a commercial activity," but it could hardly be divided even if
that portion of its use which was "for a commercial activity"
were ascertainable. It is hard to say in such situations whether
the property should be liable to execution if the major part of
its use is commercial, or whether such property should be immune
as long as any of its use is for a non-commercial activity, The
congressional intent and the Act itself are unclear.
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and subdivisions, is phrased so as to remove immunity
from certain property, rather than from the sovereign
entity itself. This approach provides, in general,
for narrower withdrawal of immunity than is contem-
plated in §1610Cb), which applies only to agencies
and instrumentalities,5 5 and which removes the im-
munity of the sovereign entity and, ipso facto, that
of all its property.
Section 1610(a)(1) makes property liable to execu-
tion if the state has waived its own immunity from
execution or attachment in aid of execution.56 How-
ever, even if a state explicitly waives its own im-
munity by contract or treaty, for instance, its pro-
perty remains immune from execution unless it is
used for a commercial activity. Apparently, the Act
draws a distinction between the immunity of a foreign
state and that of its property. This distinction is
unique to the Act, and was probably the result of
inadvertent drafting rather than any specific intent
on the part of the drafters to create a new dichotomy
in international law. 57
55. Agencies and instrunentalities are defined in 28 IJ..,C.
§1603(b) (19-76);
An agency or instrumentality of a foreign state"
means any entity--
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or
otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or politi-
cal subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares
or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign
state or political subdivison thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the
United States as defined in section 1332(c) and (d)
of this title, nor created -under the laws of any
third country,
Application of these criteria will necessarily involve difficult
and complicated questions of foreign law. Courts have, however,
dealt with such issues in the past. See, e.g., Yessenin-Vbpin -y.
Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849 CS.D.N.Y. 1978); Edlow Inter-
national v. Nuklearna Elektrarna Krsko, 441 F. Supp, 827 (1977):
and Krajina v. The Tass Agency, [19491 2 All E.R. 274 (CIA.).
56. The immunity referred to in 28 U;S-.C. §1610Ca)(l) C976)
is that of the sovereign entity, not that of the property. See
I.R, REP. NO,.-94-1487, supra.note 5, at 28,
57. Nothing in H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, sapra note 5, indicates
that the authors realized -that this dichotomy was being created.
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At any rate, an effective waiver of immunity from
execution can be made either explicitly or implicitly
by the state. An explicit waiver would include a 58
clause in a treaty or contract governing a transaction,
But it was also intended that the Act be interpreted
such that "a foreign state may have waived its immunityr
from execution, inter alia, by ... an official state-
ment, or certain steps taken by the foreign state in 59
the proceedings leading to judgment or to execution."
This reference in the House Report to waiver by "cer-
tain steps taken by the foreign state in the proceed-
ings leading to Judgment" is curious, and merits exam-
ination.
Prior to the Act, courts had held that any action
by a foreign state in a proceeding, other than enter-
ing a special appearance to contest jurisdiction, Wight
constitute a waiver of immunity from jurisdiction. O
But the prior case law had generally maintained that a
waiver of jurisdiction, whether explicit or implicit,
was not al o effective as a waiver of immunity from
execution.9l Since the House Report's reference to
58. Certain clauses in a contract (e.g., an agreement by
the parties to submit disputes to binding arbitration), may also
constitute implicit waivers of immunity. See .VictQry Transport v.
Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d
354 (2d Cir. 1964); and Ipitrade Int'l, S.A. v. Federal Republic
of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp 824 (D.D.C. 1978).
59. H.R. REP. NO, 94-1487, supra note 5, at 28.
60. The entry of a general appearance has been held to act
as a waiver of immunity. Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba v. 4/V
Ciudad de la Habana, 335 F.2d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 1964); The Sao
Vicente, 281 F. 111, 114 (2d Cir. 1922), cert. dismissed, 260 13.S.
151, petition for writ of prohibition and/or mandmus dismissed,
264 U.S. 105 (1924); Ervin v. Quintinilla, 99 F.2d 935, 938 (5th
Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S.; 635 C1939). The act of taking
depositions and appearing in court to request adjournment of the
service of process was held to be a waiver in The Mangolia, 1942
A.M.C. 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
61. Dexter and Carpenter, Inc., v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrel-
sen, 43 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 896 (1931);
and New York and Cuba X.S,S, v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684
(S.D.N.Y. 1955). But cf. Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba v. M/V
Ciudad de la Habana, 335 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1964) (failure to
assert sovereign immunity from jurisdiction after attachment of
ship held to have waived immunity from execution "inferentially"),
128 f7OL. 5
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"certain steps ... in the proceedings leading to
judgment" can only refer to those steps which are in-
consistent with the entry of a special appearance or
its equivalent, it raises the question whether Con-
gress intended this part of the Act to overrule the
case law by having certain implicit waivers of juris-
dictional immunity also constitute waivers of immunity
from execution. Such a construction of §1610(a)(1)
would provide very broad liability to execution in
cases where a state failed to raise the issue of
immunity from jurisdiction at the outset, however,
and seems inconsistent with the Act's other limita-
tions on executions against state property.6 2
The wording and legislative history of §1610(a)(1)
leave no doubt that the drafters intended to make it
impossible for a foreign state to withdraw a waiver
of immunity from execution or attachment unless the
withdrawal is accomplished in compliance with a provi-
sion of the original waiver. 63 In the past, foreign
states had on occasion reneged on waiver agreements; in
such cases the courts, at times prodded by the State
Department, generally held that sovereign immunity
applied.6 4' This approach has been abandoned in the
Act in favor of "the better view ... that a foreign
state which has induced a private person into a con-
tract by promising not to invoke its immunity cannot,
when a dispute arises, go back on its promise and seek
to revoke the waiver unilaterally." 5 Of course, this
provision also has the effect of rendering implicit
waivers irrevocable.
bZ. Particularly noteworthy is CQngress failure to include
judgments arising from claims under 28 U.S.C. §16&5(a)Cl) (1976),
which covers implicit waivers of immunit. from jurisdiction, as a
-ground for execution against the property of an agency under
§1610(b) C2).
63. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 5, at 18, for
a discussion of the principles governing waiver.
64. See, e.g., Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc, v. President of
India, 446 F,2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1971) CState Department recommendation
of immunity given effect despite waiver clause in original con-
tract); and Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, !.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir.
1961) (same). The circumstances surrounding the latter case are
described in Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits against Foreign
States: Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Adminis-
trative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d.Sess. 65-66 C1976) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings on H.R. 11315]; and Note, The Castro- Government in Ameri-
can Courts., 6overein In-unfty and 'the Act of State Doctrine,
75 HARV. L. REV. 1607, 1610-11 (1962).
65. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 5, at 18.
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Section 1610(a)(2) removes immunity from execution
from all property which "is or was used for the commer-
cial activity on which the claim is based." The ambi-
guous phrase "used for" appears again, but the
difficulties it engenders will have already been dis-
posed of by the court's initial determination that the
property is used for a commercial activity. Certainly,
it would be inconsistent to find that property wasfused for" a commercial activity for other subsections
of §1610, but not for this one.
Some commentators have pointed out a further ambi-
guity in §1610Ca)(2): It is not clear whether the
commercial activity must be the identical one which
formed the basis for the claim, or whether it need only
be generically the same. 6 6 And if the answer is the
latter, what constitutes the genus? While this ques-
tion will not arise in suits against agencies and
instrumentalities of foreign states,6 7 it may pose con-
siderable difficulties in cases involving states or
their political subdivisions. For instance, assume
that an American corporation engaged in selling grain
has obtained a judgment against a foreign state for
damage caused to its facilities by the state's ship
when it docked to load a cargo of wheat. If the state
refuses to pay the judgment, must the grain company
seek execution against the ship which originally caused
the damage, or may it seek execution against other
property of that state which is used in buying grain?
The solution to problems such as this depends upon
whether courts interpret each discrete transaction as
a separate "commercial activity," or as one in a series
of transactions which together constitute a commercial
activity. No definitive rule can be expounded. In
66. This ambiguity was first pointed out to the congres-
sional committee considering the original version of the Act
by the Report of the Comittee on International Law of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York. See Hearings
on H.R. 11315, supra note 64, at 76. Curiously, the committee
took no action to clarify the meaning of the section. See also
von M1ehren, supra note 7, at 63.
67. Since the claim would have to be based on a commercial
activity in which the defendant agency or instrumentality was
engaged, all property of the agency or instrumentality would be
liable to execution under 28 '.S.C. - §1610.(b(2) "and §1605C aC.
1976), rega:rdles- of its use. See pp, 132-133 infra,
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deciding what is a "commercial activity," Congress in-
tended that judges be flexible; an act constituting
a commercial activity in one set of circumstances
might, in another context, be only a part of a wider
commercial activity. 6 8 Judicial consideration of
all of the circumstances surrounding the transaction
in question is in order, although the Act should not
be read as giving judges an entirely free rein.
For instance, in the hypothetical above, the
"commercial activity" could arguably be (A) the single
transaction in question, (B) the buying and shipping
of wheat, CC) the buying and shipping of grains, or
(D) the buying and shipping of foodstuffs. In decid-
ing which characterization to apply, a court would
need to determine, at the least, whether the transac-
tion sued on was an emergency measure designed to al-
leviate a temporary shortage, or whether the foreign
state regularly traded in wheat, or other grains or
foodstuffs.
Section 1610(a)(2) was deliberately designed to
stifle any attempt to circumvent the provisions of the
Act by transferring property to another use or func-
tion subsequent to the incident upon which the claim
is based, but prior to execution.09 Moreover, the
fact that it allows execution against property which
"is or was used for the commercial activity" may have
the additional effect of providing a remedy for plain-
tiffs whose judgments are based on claims arising out
of transactions which are commercial in nature, but
unique in the experience of the state. Once such a
singular transaction is completed, there will be no
property which "is" used for the commercial activity
upon which the claim is based. Since none of the
other §1610(a) exceptions would apply, the plaintiff
would be without recourse if it were not for the retro-
spective application of this provision.
68, Such an approach would be in harmony with both the deg.thn
tion of "emercial activityl in 28 .S'.C. §1603Cie (19761 a "eitbe
a regular'course of commerel conduct or . paxticular eqmmexetcl
transaction or act," and the Congressional intent that the exact
meaning of the term "commercial activity" be left to the courts.
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 5, at 16,
69. Id. at 28.
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Section 1610(a)(C3) denies immunity from execution
if "the execution relates to a judgment establishing
rights in property which has been taken in violation
of international law or which has been exchanged f
property. taken in violation of international law. 9
The issue of whether certain property was taken in
violation of international law is left for judicial
determination, although Congress did adopt a minimum
standard requiring that the nationalization or expro-
priation of property be accompanied by payment of
prompt, adequate, and effective compensation to the
original owners,71 The exact scope of this subsection
remains open to debate.
The insertion of the term "rights in property" has
been interpreted by at least one commentator as appearr-
ing to narrow §1610ia)(3)ts scope by' excluding takings
of contract rights.712 Under this view, only takings of
certain narrow types of property rights would give rise
to a justiciable cause of action. However, this argu-
70. Due to the development of the act of state doctrine, few
American courts have dealt with cases involving or questioning the
legality under international law of takings of property. Among
the few reported cases are Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 302
F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 398 (1964);
and Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir, (1967),
71. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 5, at 19-20,
72. Von Mehren, supra note 7, at 59-61, expresses this view.
He comes to this conclusion by extrapolating from courts' inter-
pretations of the similar phrase "claim of title or other right to
property" in the Hickenlooper Amendment, 2211.SC. §2370e)(2),
But, as von Mehren notes, the only case which considered the
applicability of the Hickenlooper Amendment to concession agree-
ments (as distinguished from other contractual rights) was
Occidental of Umm al Qay., Inc. v. Cities Service Oil Co., 396
F. Supp. 461 (W.D.La. 1975). That court held that the concession
agreement at issue, which had never been acted upon by the con-
cessionaire, was not a "claim of title or other right to property,1'
but did acknowledge that "ore or oil from an expropriated mine or
well" might come under the amendment. The precedential value of
this case remains in doubt.
Sklaver, Sovereign Imnunity in the United States: An Anatysi's
of S.566, 8 INTtL LAV 408, 416 (1976) argues that Congress did
intend to include takings of contract rights, but reaches that
conclusion on different grounds than does this article.
[VOL, 5132
EXECUTTON AND ATTACHMENT UNDER THE 'F'lA
ment is not compelling. 7 3  There appears to be no
reason, under international law, for Congress so to
limit the jurisdiction of American courts,74 nor is it
clear that Congress intended to do so.75 On the other
hand, there is authority, both judicial and scholarly,
for the proposition that deeds of concession, which
are contracts, may create rights in property for the
concessionaire.7 6  The State Department has endorsed
this view.7 7  TheHouse Report itself gives no indica-
tion that only property rights created in certain ways
are to be included.78  It seems more likely, then, that
73. The assertion that Congress did not intend to alter the
existing law on the act of state doctrine (see H.R. -ER. NQ. 94-
1487, supra note 5, at 20) is not self-evident, in view of the fact
that, at the least-, 28 U.S.C. §1610QEIC31 and §1605Ea)(3) C1976)
,extend the Hickenlooper Aendment "E, they deny an act of state
defense) where the x.propxrated property is not even in the United
States. Presence of the expropriated property in the jurisdiction
had Been a prerequisite to judicial action prior to the Act,
In addition, the committee report makes it eviaent that the
Act carves out the "commercial activities exception" to the act
of state doctrine which four justices of the Supreme Court had
argued for in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,
425 U.S. 682 (1976).
74. See Weber, supra note 9, at 46.
75. The legislative report on this section is ambiguous. It
merely refers back.to the explanation of 28 U.SC. §1605(a) C3)
(1976). H,R. REP.,NQ, 94-1487, supra note 5, at 28. Neither sec-
tion mentions rights in property which may be created by contract.
76. "Eln Saudi Arabian Law, as in the Laws of the Western
Countries, the oil concession is an institution whidh implies
an authorization by the State, on the basis of a statute or of a
contract, and necessarily entails the grant to the concessionaire
of property rights in the oil." Arbitration Between Saudi Arabia
and the Arabian American Oil Co., Arbitral Award, 27 INT'L L. REP.
117, 171 (1957). See also, e.g., Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., Ltd. v.
Jaffrate (The Rose Mary), 20 INT'L L. REP. 316 (1953)(S. Ct. Aden);
and Campbell, PrincipZes of Mineral Ownev.s-hip in .the Civi4 Law
and Comon Law Systems, 31 TUL. L'. REV. 303, 311 (J-57)t Cf.
Arbitration Between Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co., California
Asiatic Oil Co., and the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic
(unpublished award on the merits, 1977) (nationalization of con-
cession held to constitute breach of contract, for which the con-
cessionaires had a right to restitutio in integrum, or damages in
lieu thereof).
77. See generally the Statement by the Department of State
on Policy on "Hot" Libyan Oil, 13 Int. Leg. Mat. 767 (1974).
78. H.R. REP. NO.. 94-1487, supra note 5, at 20.
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§1610(a)(3), and the analogous §1605(a)(3), were in-
tended to cover such takings. Thus, for the first
time in American courts, plaintiffs may be able to
litigate their rights to minerals in the ground in
foreign countries, even if such a determination would
be only ancillary to execution against property in the
United States.
The applicability of the last part of §1610(a)(3)
will be somewhat limited by the difficulty of deter-
mining property transfers in a foreign state, and
proving such transfers to the satisfaction of an
American court. 79 With fungible goods such as oil,
there will be the additional problem of proving the
source of a good which could have originated at wells
belonging to any of a number of oil concessionaires. 80
However, should there be an increase in international
barter, due perhaps to currency instability, more
cases may arise under this section. For instance, oil
which was expropriated in a foreign state might be
traded to an American trader for a shipment of steel,
In that situation, the original titleholder could seek
execution against either the steel (which now belongs
to the foreign government) or the oil in the posses-
sion of the trader. If a few such plaintiffs were
successful in seeking to regain their property, from
third parties such as the trader, the expropriating
state would soon find itself unable to sell or trade
its oil in the United States. Potential customers
would fear that they would not have good title, and
simply refuse to deal.
79, Cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 US. 398,
431-35 (1964). In Sabbatno, the Court considered such diffi-
culties as weighing heavily against the creatiod of an exception
to the act of state doctrine for takings of property in violation
of international law,
80, Id at 434. See also Anglo-Iranian 0 l Co. v. Idemitsu
Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha, 20 INT'L L. p. 305 Di:st, Ct. Tokyo)
(19531 Cthe court assumed arguend9 that contested oil bad been
extracted from plaintiff's nationalized concession, but was un-
able to determine whether the extraction took place before or
after nationalization). But proof of origin may not be unattain-
able. The plaintiff in Occidental of Umm al Qay., Inc. v.
Cities Service Oil Co,, 396 F. Supp. 461, 464 (V.D. La. 1975),
was apparently able to establish to the court's satisfaction the
origin of the cargo of oil at issue.
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Immunity is denied by §1610Ca)(4) in cases where
a foreign state has acquired immovable property
through succession or gift, and a judgment has esta-
blished the rights in that property of the person
seeking execution. This provision at least partially
reverses the previous common law rule that real pro-
perty in the United States owned by a foreign state
was immune from execution.81 The practical effect of
this subsection in terms of impact and number of cases
will be slight. Questions of inheritance or undue
influence are more likely to lead to cases under this
section than are international business transactions,
since sales or trades of property are not covered.
Under §1610(a)(5), contractual obligations to in-
demnify a state and proceeds owed to a state upon a
policy of liability insurance are treated as property
of the state and become liable to execution, provided
that the obligation on the policy arises out of the
claim which merged into the judgment. The effect of
this provision is similar to a state "direct action"
statute. 2 Its primary purpose is to protect those
who suffer injury in automobile or other accidents in-
volving employees of the foreign state. 8 3 But the
wording is quite general, and there is no reason that
this subsection would not also apply to states'. large-
scale commercial activities and their insurers.
81. See, e.g., City of New Rochelle v. Republic of Ghana,
44 Misc. 2d 773, 255 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1964), and State ex rel Nat-
ional Institute of Agrarian Reform v. Dekle, 137 So.2d 581 (1962)
UFla. Dist. Ct.), cert. denied, 146 So.2d 753.
82. Examples of such statutes are found at 22 LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. 655 (West 1978) and WIS; STAT. ANN. 632.24 (West
Supp. 1978). In some states, such as New York, the judicial
equivalent of a direct action statute has been created. See,
e.g., Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 26q N.Y.S.2d
9R (1966). The constitutionality of such statutes has come
under attack since the Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), but they have generally been up-
held. See, e.g., Savchuk v. Rush, _ Minn._ , 245 N.W.2d
624 (1976), vacated and remanded, 433 U.S. 902 (1977), aff'd en
banc, 272 N W.2d 888 (1978) (14innesota statute upheld as consti-
tutional); O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.
1978) (New York common law rule upheld); Alford v. McGaw, 402
N.Y.S.2d 499 (App. Div. 1978)(same).
83. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 5, at 29.
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This is quite important, for there may be cases
involving large commercial accidents in which the
obligation of the insurer is the only substantial as-
set available, especially where the accident involves
a state with little commercial contact with the United
States. An example can be easily envisioned. Suppose
that a tanker belonging to Libya, en route to a Cana-
dian refinery with a cargo of crude oil, goes aground
and breaks up off the coast of Maine, causing millions
of dollars in property damage and clean-up costs. If
the Libyan government has no property in the United
States which can be executed against, plaintiffs would
have no recourse but to bring suit against Lloyd's of
London, or whemeyer had insured the ship. There would
be adequate assets, since the plaintiff could elect to
enforce the judgment in any jurisdiction in which the
insurer did business.8 4 The burden of this method of
enforcing a judgment might fall on the insurers, who
could, at times, find themsplves paying twice -- once
in the United States to injured plaintiffs and once
elsewhere to the insured. The insurer could always
implead the foreign state in the American action, but
it is not certain that a judgment there would be given
res judicata effect in the courts of other nations if
and when the foreign state brought suit upon the
policy. 85
E. §1610(b): Further Exceptions for the Property
of Agencies
The drafters of the Act were more generous to
American plaintiffs in §1610(b), which provides addi-
84. The likely jurisdiction would be New York, since almost
all insurance companies could be found "doing business" there.
Like most states, New York requires insurers to have available
substantial assets to ensure satisfaction of claims in the state.
27 N.Y. INS. L. §§411, 413, 425 (McKinney 1966).
8-5. Recognition of the American judgment might depend on a
variety of factors, including the foreign judgment recognition
policies of the American forum state and the foreign state where
the insured brings suit, the public policies of the foreign forum,
and the existence of any international agreement binding on both
fora. See generalZy Homburger, Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments, 18 AX, J .- CO1N', L.. 367 (1970); and von Mehren
and Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and
Suggested Approach, 8i MAV, L, REV. 1601 C1968).
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tional exceptions from immunity for the property of
agencies and instrumentalities of foreign states. If
the agency is engaged in an sort of commercial acti-
vity in the United States, then all of its property
is subject to execution if one of two additional con-
ditions is fulfilled: either there-must have been a
waiver of immunity from execution, or else the judg-
ment sued upon must relate to a claim for which im-
munity from jurisdiction is denied by §§1605(a)(2),
(3), (5) or 1605(b). This contrasts sharply with the
provisions for execution of property under §1610(a),
where immunity hinges on the nature and use of the
property. The distinction is important, because it
means that in most suits against an agency of a for-
eign state, all of the agency's property in the United
States will be available to satisfy any judgment
entered. Since the bulk of cases involving American
businesses will arise under §§1605(a)(2), (3), (5), or
1605(b), the effect of the second condition is to make
the agency's non-immunity from execution nearly coex-
tensive with its non-immunity from jursidiction, as
far as many business plaintiffs are concerned.
The principles governing waiver by an agency or
instrumentality are identical to those mentioned
earlier in the discussion on waiver by states. 8 7 An
action which has been or would be judged a waiver by
a foreign state would also constitute a waiver if
taken by an agency. In seeking execution under §1610
(b)(1), it is important to keep in mind that the ac-
tion constituting the implicit or explicit waiver can
be taken by the agency or its parent government. 8 8
But even with the broadened provisions for
waivers, most plaintiffs will proceed under the even
more liberal second exception, §1610(b)(2), which
denies immunity when "the judgment relates to a claim
for which the agency or instrumentality is not immune
by virtue of section 1605(a)(2), (3), or (5), or
1605(b) of this chapter, regardless of whether the
property is or was used for the activity upon which
the claim is based." A brief examination of the scope
of these provisions of §1605 is necessary.
86. The commercial activity need only have a "substantial
contact" with the United States. See'28 U.S.C. §16Q4Ce (19761
and H.R. REP. NO. -4-41487,' supra note.5, at 16-17 M t9 nhether
an activity is commercial in nature, see notes.4'-44a And
accompanying text.
87. See note 62 supra, and text at pp. 124-125.
88. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 5, at 18 and 28,
137
YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
§1605(a)(2). Probably the most important excep-
tion for the conduct of international business is
§1605(a)(2), which denies immunity from jurisdiction
in three categories of cases:
...[those in which] the action is based
upon a commercial activity carried on
in the United States by the foreign
state; or upon an act performed in the
United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere; or upon an act outside
the territory of the United States in
connection with a commercial activity
of the foreign state elsewhere and that
act causes a direct effect in the
United States;...
The first category of actions, those "based upon
a commercial activity carried on in the United States,"
is the broadest of the three. It would automatically
subsume many actions which might otherwise be brought
under the second category. In order to be carried on
in the United States, the commercial activity need not
be performed entirely in the United States.8 9 Rather,
the activity is required only to have a "substantial
contact" here. 9 0 Congress clearly left it to the
courts to determine what constitutes "substantial con-
tact," although it did require "a degree of contact
beyond that occasioned simply by U.S. citizenship or
U.S. residence of the plaintiff ."91
In practice, the first category may well blend in
with the second with no adverse results. Courts need
not draw a sharp distinction, since only one or the
other must be satisfied. In cases falling into the
second category, the commercial activity need not take
place in the United States, although some act performed
89. Id. at 17.
90. Id.
91. Id. See aZso Upton v. Empire of Iran, 459 F. Supp, 264
(D.DC. 1978).
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in connection with the activity must. 9 2 The limits of
this category will be drawn by interpretations of the
minimum contact required to cause an act to be perform-
ed "in connection with a commercial activity" else-
where.
The jurisdictional necessity that an act have some
nexus with the United States is satisfied in the third
category, by the requirement that the act, though per-
formed abroad, have a "direct effect in the United
States." 9 3 The breadth of the jurisdiction granted by
this part of §1605(a)(2) will depend on the meaning
given to the term "direct effect" by the courts, which
92. Such situations would include "a representation in the
United States by an agent of a foreign state that leads to an ac-
tion for restitution based on unjust enrichment; an act in the
United States that violates U.S. securities laws or regulations;
[or] the wrongful discharge in the U.S. of an employee of a for-
eign state who has been employed in connection with a commercial
activity carried on in some third country." H.R. REP. NO. 94-
1487, supra note 5, at 19. Depending on the circumstances, some
of these acts might also constitute commercial activities under
the definition in 28 11.S.C. 91603Cd) C1976), and thus also come
under.the first-categpry in §1605(a)C2).
93. See H.R. FXP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 5, at 19: "The
third situation ... would embrace commercial conduct abroad having
direct effects within the United States which would subject such
conduct to the exercise of jurisdiction by the United States con-
sistent with principles set forth in section 18, Restatement of
the Law, Second, Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(1965) ."
Section 18 reads:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs
outside its territory and causes an effect within
its territory, if either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally
recognized as constituent elements of a crime or tort
under the law of states that have reasonably developed
legal systems, or
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent
elements of activity to which the rule applies; (ii) the
effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it
occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct
outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsis-
tent with the principles of justice generally recognized
by states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
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are grappling with the issue.94 In the most important
case decided to date, Carey v. National Oil Corp.,95 the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adopted a view
of this term which unduly narrows the scope of juris-
diction under this section. If the Second Circuit's
interpretation is widely applied, only circumstances
substantially analogous to the celebrated "bullet
across the border" would qualify as "direct effects"
giving rise to a justiciable cause of action.9 0 Whe-
ther the jurisdiction granted in this clause of §1605
(a)(2) is thus to be restricted still remains to be
seen, however.
§1605(a)(3). Section 1605(a)(3) covers claims
arising out of violations of international law.97 im-
munity is denied when the expropriated property, or
any property exchanged therefore, is owned or operated
by an agency which is engaged in a commercial activity
in the United States. Again, the Act makes it easier
to execute against the property of an agency than a-
gainst that of a foreign state. While execution a-
gainst state property under §1610(a)(3) is limited to
the expropriated property and any property exchanged
for it which is found in the United States, in the case
of execution against agency property, neither the ex-
propriated property nor any property exchanged for it
need be present in the United States.9 8 Moreover,
94. See, e.g., Upton v. Empire of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 264
(D.D.C. 1978) and Carey v. National Oil Corp., 592 F.2d 673 C2d
Cir. 19J9)..
95. In Carey v. National Oil Corp., 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir.
1979), the Second Circuit adopted a narrow view of the term "di-
rect effect" in holding that the actions of Libyan instrumentali-
ties in breaching a contract with a wholly-owned Bahamian subsi-
diary of an American corporation, and the actions of the Libyan
government in inducing such a breach, had no direct effect in the
United States. The court reached this conclusion even though
the defendants knew that the Bahamian corporation's sole function
was to refine the oil and funnel it to the American parent, and
there was evidence to the effect that the defendants' actions were
taken for the explicit purpose of cutting off oil supplies to the
United States, thereby hoping to cause economic injury here.
96. However, actions such as that involving the Libyan oil
tanker, discussed at pp. 131-132 supra, could conceivably still be
brought.
97. See notes, 62-79 supra, and accompanying text.
98. HR. Rp. NQ, 94-1487, supra note 5, at 19,
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since under this provision the property can be either
movable or immovable, it seems especially likely to
have a wider practical application than §1610(a)(3).
For instance, a plaintiff whose oil refinery had been
expropriated without compensation would have a re-
course if the refinery were now owned or operated by
an agency, whereas he would not be able to execute a-
gainst the state unless it could be shown that the
property seized in the United States had been exchang-
ed for the refinery. Despite its broader scope, this
section, like §1610(a)(3), will be hampered by the
difficulty of proving property transfers and ownership
in a foreign state.
§1605(a)(5). The wording of §1605(a)(5) is deli-
berately general, in order to cover cases:
,..not otherwise encompassed in paragraph
(2) above, in which money damages are
sought against a foreign state for personal
injury or death, or damage to or loss of
property, occurring in the United States
and caused by the tortious act or omission
of that foreign state or of any official or
employee of that foreign state while acting
within the scope of his office or employ-
ment; except this paragraph shall not apply
to--
(A) any claim based upon the exercise
or performance or the failure to exercise
or perform a discretionary function re-
gardless of whether the discretion be
abused, or
(B) any claim arising out of mali-
cious prosecution, abuse of process,
libel, slander, misrepresentation, de-
ceit, or interference with contract
rights.99
The primary objective of this subsection, as with
§1610(a)(5), is to provide a remedy for victims of
automobile accidents, although it applies to a variety
of other non-commercial torts as well.1 0 0 The deli-
berate exclusion of claims based upon discretionary
acts and claims arising from interference with con-
tract rights means that it will have little signifi-
99. Id. at 20-21.
100. Id.
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cance for the conduct of international business,1 0 1
§16a5CbJ, The law In the area of maritime liens is
substantially revised Ty §1605Cb), whicn denies imr.
munity from execution when the lien "is based upon a
commercial activity of a foreign state. " 1 0 2 Under the
Act, the nature of the claim is changed, so that it is
no longer brought in rem against the ship, but rather
in personam against the sovereign owner.103 In addi-
tion, a special procedure for service of process is
prescribed, by which the plaintiff may gain in person-
am Jurisdiction over the state,104 The intent of the
drafters that in rem jurisdiction be done away with is
underscored by the harsh penalty -dismissal of the
cause of action".n provided for all plaintiffs who at,
tempt to use in rem methods to arrest ships which they
know, or should know, belong'to a foreign state.105
And while recovery under §1605(b) is limited to the
value of the ship and its cargo, this poses no great
hardship for plaintiffs. Section 1605(b) does not
preclude the bringing of another action under this or
some other section of the Act, to recover the differ,-
ence between the amount realized and the amount due., 0 6
Under the jurisdictional provisions referred to in
§1610(b)C2), the justiciability of a claim depends upon
the nature of the underlying transaction or act, whether
it be a contract or a nationalization. Section 1610(b)C2),
by removing immunity from execution in cases arising un-
der these provisions, makes the immunity from execution
dependent upon the nature of the act underlying the
claim. It makes little difference whether this
development is explained by a theory of waiver Ci.ej,
that by undertaking certain activities an agency waives
its immunity from jurisdiction and execution),
101. Cf. Carey v. National Oil Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1097
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (allegation of tortious interference with contract
rights under concession agreement does not state a justiciable
claim under the Act).
102. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 5, at 21-22,
103. For a thorough discussion of the nature of the maritime
lien, see G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, 586 et seq.
(1957),
104, 28 U.S.C, §1605(b) (1) & C2) C1976).
105. This provision was invoked in Jet Line Services, Inc V.
N/V Narsa El Hariga, Civ. No. Y-78-80 (D. Md. 1978), to terminate
the action of a plaintiff who refused to release an attached ship
belonging to a foreign state.
106. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 5, at 22.
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or by asserting that no immunity attaches to certain
activities. In either case, §1610(b)(2) is a radical
departure from prior practice and affords an agency
a much more restricted immunity than is given to the
state itself.
F. §1610(d): Narrowed Use of Attachment
Prior to the enactment of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, both the State Department and the
courts had allowed the use of attachment against a
foreign state, but only for purposes of gaining quasi
in rem jurisdiction.1 07 The Act prohibits this prac-
tice, but more than makes up for the deprivation with
the liberal personal service provisions of §1608.10
Moreover, §1610(d) of the Act does provide for attach-
ment if the foreign state has explicitly waived its
immunity from attachment prior to judgment, and if
"the purpose of the attachment is to secure satisfac-
tion of a judgment that has been or ultimately may be
entered against the foreign state .... "109 Again, the
Act is deliberately vague; the need for continuous
judicial supervision, both at the commencement and
during the duration of the attachment, is obvious.
It remains to be seen whether plaintiffs can make
effective use of this provision, but it is certain
that potential plaintiffs would do well to ensure that
contracts governing their transactions with foreign
states contain an explicit waiver of immunity from
pre-judgment attachment, whenever possible. This pro-
vision of the Act appears to be quite narrowly drawn,
although it could have an important effect in cases
where an explicit waiver has been made by the state.
Quick use of this attachment provision once an action
is begun might prevent the transfer of property from
commercial to non-commercial use, greatly strengthen-
ing the plaintiff's hand in subsequent court proceed-
107, However, this practice was not permitted until 1959.
See note 10 supra.
108. See note 7 supra, and 28 U.S.G. S1608 C1976).
109, H.R, REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 5, at 30.
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ings or negotiations.1 1 0
G. §1610(c): Necessity for a Court Order
In the past, various methods, ranging from court
orders to simple application to a local sheriff, have
sufficed to attach or execute against the property of
foreign states.1 1 1 Congress felt that some of these
methods failed to afford states adequate protection of
their rights, and were likely to have adverse conse-
quences on American foreign relations.1 1 2 Therefore,
a prohibition was inserted in §1610(c), forbidding exe-
cution or attachment without a court order.1 1 3 The
court order, in turn, must be preceded by a finding by
110. Such a transfer would render the property immune
from execution. See notes 34-36 supra and accompanying text. A
good example of the pressure which a plaintiff could bring to bear
is found in the recent litigation involving Ipitrade International,
S.A. and the Nigerian government. A Swiss arbitrator had awarded
Ipitrade $9,066,138.75 in a compulsory arbitration arising out of
the breach of a cement contract between the two parties. When
Nigeria refused to pay the award, Ipitrade sought successfully to
have the arbitration registered in the United States (Ipitrade
Int'l, S.A. v. Nigeria, 465 F. Supp. 824 (DD.C. 1978)), and
sought attachment of certain property in France. In the French
action, Ipitrade was able to attach funds held for or owed to
Nigeria by French banks and industrial concerns. Nigeria then
agreed to settle the claim for about $6,000,000, and the French
attachment was lifted. Ipitrade Int'l S.A. v. Banque Nationale
de Paris, Judgment of Sept. 12, 1978, Trib. gr. inst., Paris,
111. Cf. Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 21 Misc,2d 1086,
192 N.Y.S,2d 469 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (attachment by application to
sheriff); Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela,
420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d 864 (S. Ct. 1966) (same).
112. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 5, at 30,
113. 28 U.S.C, §1610(c) (1976):
No attachment or execution referred to in subsections
(a) and () of this section shall be permitted until the
court has ordered such attachment and execution after
having determined that a reasonable period of time has
elapsed following the entry of judgment and the giving of
any notice required under section 1608(e) of this chapter,
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the court that "a reasonable period of time" has
elapsed since the entry of judgment and the giving of
any notice required. A good deal of discretion was
given to courts in deciding when a reasonable time has
elapsed, thus allowing them to exercise flexibility
according to the circumstances of the case.ll4 In
making such decisions, courts are to "take into ac-
count procedures, including legislation, that may be
necessary for payment of a judgment by a foreign
state, which may take several months; representations
by the foreign state of steps being taken to satisfy
the judgment;...or evidence that the foreign state
is about to remove assets from the jurisdiction to
frustrate satisfaction of the judgment."11 5 Plain-
tiffs attempting to secure such an order should be on
the lookout for supporting evidence, such as prior
instances of evasion of judgments by the defendant
state, or statements by agents of the state which
would indicate an intent to evade satisfaction of the
judgment.
Execution and attachment of the assets of a for-
eign state are not automatic. It is up to the plain-
tiff'to convince the court that one or the other is
warranted in a given case. But, in considering whe-
ther or not to grant motions for execution or attach-
ment, courts should be careful not to err too much in
favor of the defendant state, for to do so may well
deprive a plaintiff of his sole means of satisfying a
judgment against an intransigent sovereign.
Conclusion
The execution and attachment provisions of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act represent drastic
departures from the prior law in those areas. But, as
this discussion has served to show, the Act also
leaves numerous unanswered questions. Knowing this
fact, Congress deliberately left to the courts a good
deal of flexibility in applying the standards set out
in the Act.
114. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, supra note 5, at 30.
115. Id.
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It will be up to the courts to interpret the Act
and to give definition to its presently vague standards.
The manner in which they accomplish this task will deter-
mine whether the Act heralds a new era of security for
those engaged in commercial dealings with foreign states,
or whether they will still have to rely on the goodwill
of the foreign state. The execution and attachment provi-
sions can serve the important function of providing sanc-
tions for the Act's jurisdictional provisions, but only
if the general intent of the Act governs the process of
adjudication.
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